

Introduction

Martina Fürst and Guido Melchior

This special issue collects the results of the workshop “The Philosophy of Keith Lehrer” which was held in October 2010 at the University of Graz, Austria, where Keith Lehrer is Honorary Professor and Honorary Doctor of Philosophy. Over the last decades Lehrer has been a frequent visitor in Graz. As a much admired teacher and scholar, has decisively influenced generations of students and inspired many of them to choose an academic career. The guest-editors, who organized the workshop, want to thank all the participants for making the workshop a success. Special thanks go to Keith Lehrer for commenting on each talk at the workshop as well as each contribution to this volume. We are grateful to Stuart Cohen for publishing this issue in his prestigious journal.

This volume honors Lehrer and his invaluable contributions to philosophy. It contains five chapters, each illustrating the impressively wide range of his philosophy. The chapters are divided into discussions and applications of Lehrer’s work in theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The fifth and final chapter contains his replies to all of the contributions.

Theoretical Knowledge

The first part of the issue is devoted to Keith Lehrer’s account of theoretical knowledge. The papers in this section cover a broad range of topics, including: Lehrer’s notions of acceptance and trustworthiness, his account of the basing relation, his thoughts on the lottery paradox, and his proposed solution to the skeptical problem compared to that of the Mooreans.

Marian David explores Lehrer’s notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them. He adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer’s views on these topics have developed over the years. David argues that Lehrer’s theory of trustworthiness has evolved. Trustworthiness has moved away from a notion of truth to a, if not *the*, fundamental normative notion of his epistemology. According to Lehrer, is supposed to explain reasonableness; and acceptance no longer aims at truth, but at what is worthy of acceptance and worthy of our trust.

Pascal Engel examines Lehrer’s distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and other related doxastic attitudes. In his first step, he sketches a taxonomy of doxastic attitudes that characterizes acceptance as a primarily pragmatic attitude. This can be contrasted with Lehrer’s thesis that acceptance is an epistemic

attitude that is intimately connected to his account of the “loop of reason”. In a second step, Engel argues that Lehrer’s account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in his analysis of reason.

Hannah Tierney and **Nicholas D. Smith** review Lehrer’s account of the basing relation. They argue that Lehrer’s examples of the superstitious lawyer and the racist Raco convincingly show that beliefs need not be based on the evidence in order to be justified. They claim that these cases illustrate that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based on the evidence. They then argue that Lehrer’s account is more plausible than alternative accounts that have been offered.

Glenn Ross reflects on the lottery paradox. He proposes that one can have reason to choose a few tickets in a lottery and arbitrarily believe of them that they will lose. This view, Ross argues, is compatible with parts of Lehrer’s theory of rational acceptance. However, the reasonability of believing that a lottery ticket will lose does not constitute the kind of justification required for knowledge. Moreover, one should not accept what one takes to have a low chance of being true. Accordingly, one should not believe of too many tickets that they are to lose.

Guido Melchior compares Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. He argues that there are strong similarities between them: Neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge, though Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Melchior concludes that all else being equal, there are good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical approach.

Practical Knowledge

The second part of this issue focuses on Lehrer’s work with regard to practical knowledge. The essays cover a broad range of topics, including: wisdom, free will, the application of the concept of self-trust to feminist ethics, and an account of institutional virtue inspired by the Lehrer-Wagner model of consensus.

Nenad Mišćević’s paper is dedicated to Lehrer’s proposal that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error. First, Mišćević puts Lehrer’s account on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom and raises critical questions about such an account. Second, he develops the following alternative proposal inspired by Lehrer’s work: Wisdom is the reflective meta-level endorsement of one’s phronesis-generated

action-guiding desires-preferences, one's first-level reliably generated factual beliefs about the causal structure in human matters, and knowledge of fact-value dependencies.

Kristin Borgwald applies Lehrer's ideas in his book *Self-trust* to feminist care ethics. In her essay she highlights that patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their own trust concerning what they accept. Women who are unable to accept, for example, their anger over their own mistreatment, exhibit a lack of what Borgwald calls *epistemic personhood*. This concept is based on Lehrer's theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Borgwald uses the concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.

Danilo Suster examines Lehrer's contribution to the discussion on free will. David Lewis acknowledges that his compatibilist response to van Inwagen's consequence argument for incompatibilism resembles Lehrer's strategy. By comparing Lewis's and Lehrer's response, Suster argues that one can identify a Lehrer-Lewis strategy, although Lewis's variation is slightly dialectically stronger according to Suster. Finally, Suster provides a response to some standard incompatibilist objections to the Lehrer-Lewis response.

Anita Konzelmann Ziv presents an account of institutional virtue which is modelled as a "consensual" property, along the lines of the Lehrer-Wagner model of consensus. In her argumentation she defends the following three claims: First, institutional virtue must be able to motivate supererogatory action. Second, the thesis of discontinuity of institutional virtue with individual virtue exhibits serious shortcomings. Third, the Lehrer-Wagner model of consensus, with its main features of iteration and evaluation, has the explanatory potential to account for institutional virtue.

Philosophy of Language

The papers in the third section outline Keith and Adrienne Lehrer's philosophy of language and address various aspects of their theory, such as the notions of reference, sense, and sense vectors in Lehrer semantics.

Adrienne Lehrer summarizes the theory of word meaning, jointly developed with Keith Lehrer, which accommodates the empirical facts of natural languages, especially the diversity of types of words. They use the metaphor of *vectors* to show how different, sometimes competing, forces interact to provide an understanding of what a word in context means. A formal theory for understanding the relationship of idiolects, dialects, and communal

languages is proposed to account for the continuous dynamic interaction of individuals and communities.

Alfred Schramm deals first with the question of how Lehrerian sense can be empirically distinguished from Lehrerian reference. Second, he suggests to interpret the Lehrers' concept of sense respectively sense vectors as intension concepts. Third, he argues that the Lehrers' communal languages are collections of family-resembling idiolects of individual speakers and hypotheses of individual speakers about the idiolects of their fellow speakers. Finally, Schramm proposes to have both: normal languages from an empirical point of view, and codified languages from a logical reconstructionist one.

Philosophy of Mind

Part four is dedicated to Lehrer's philosophy of mind and focuses primarily on his account of "exemplarization".

Johann C. Marek's paper has two objectives. First, it highlights the parallels between Alexius Meinong's account of self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer's model of the exemplarization of experiences. Second, it critically reflects on Lehrer's account of exemplarization by raising questions such as the following: How can we represent a specific experience (for example, a red-experience) by exemplarization, given that a multifarious experience (for example, a red and round-experience) is the sample?

Leopold Stubenberg critically examines Lehrer's claim that exemplarization provides an explanation of epistemological questions about consciousness and, once this is done, no metaphysical puzzles of consciousness remain. Stubenberg argues in a first step that Lehrer's account of consciousness does leave a metaphysical remainder. Then, Stubenberg goes on to offer a proposal that would allow Lehrer to deal with the outlined problems, but which would amount to a substantial revision of Lehrer's account of consciousness.

Martina Fürst argues that Lehrer's account of exemplarization fails in its attempt to solve the ontological problem of consciousness, if this problem is formulated in terms of the zombie-argument. First, she draws parallels between exemplarization and the physicalist phenomenal concept strategy as a response to the zombie-argument. In a second step, Fürst demonstrates that exemplarization neither offers a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor a physicalist account of their impossibility.

Joseph Tolliver focuses on Lehrer's explanation of how we can gain ineffable knowledge of what an art object is like by exemplarizing an experience of the art object. He argues that Lehrer's claim that exemplar concepts function as vehicles of ineffable representation is

plausible only on the further assumption that exemplar concepts have two important features: They are *directly referential* and *lucid*. The first feature explains the role of exhibition in grasping their meaning, the latter one the epistemic characteristics of application of exemplar concepts to the exemplarized experiences which are their representational vehicle.

Keith Lehrer's Replies

The issue is completed by Lehrer's replies to the papers within this volume. Lehrer begins his essay by providing the reader with an overview of where he stands now, outlining the assumptions that lie at the heart of his responses. This is followed by detailed replies to each paper, which reflect Lehrer's illuminating philosophy, impressive clarity and elegant style. In his replies, Lehrer guides the reader on the path towards achieving his philosophical goal of maximizing explanation. The final essay of this issue provides the reader with deep insights and a profound understanding of Lehrer's philosophy continued by his latest monograph "Art, Self and Knowledge."

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