FWF stand-alone project P 28884: The Skeptical Perspective Duration: 01.04.2016-31.03.2019
Research grant: 202.256,25 €
Resume Skepticism is the thesis that we cannot have knowledge in a domain in which we ordinarily think that knowledge is possible. Skepticism is a problem because it conflicts with our common sense view and our positive philosophical assumptions about the possibilities of knowledge. From this point of view, explaining and solving the skeptical problem is still one of the central challenges in epistemology and many epistemological approaches can be regarded as a reaction to skepticism in one way or another. Skepticism can take different forms. This project aims to provide a novel explanation and solution for the most discussed version of skepticism—skepticism about the external world as introduced by Descartes. In the contemporary literature, the problem is presented in the form of the following argument: If I have knowledge about the external world, then I know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. I do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. Therefore, I do not have knowledge about the external world. This argument confronts us with a puzzle: Each of the premises seems plausible, but the conclusion seems unacceptable. A satisfying solution to the skeptical problem has to accomplish two tasks: First, it has to show how we can have knowledge about the external world, and, second, it must explain the striking plausibility of the skeptical argument. In this research project, I will elaborate the following novel view. We have to distinguish the cognitive processes of ordinary belief-acquisition and self-reflection from those involved in self-reflection based on doubting one’s own experiences and beliefs. In the case of ordinary self-reflection, we form beliefs about the world and, partly based on these beliefs, we reflectively believe that we have true beliefs about the world. The skeptic argues that this is an instance of Moorean reasoning that faces the problem of transmission failure, or insensitivity, or of unpersuasiveness. I will argue that these problems only arise for the particular cognitive process of self-reflection based on doubting one’s own beliefs. This cognitive process is based on a shift of perspective by taking a detached point of view towards our own mental states when focusing on the representational nature of our own experiences and beliefs. I label this view ‘perspectivism’.